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Notes
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CANCER VICTIMS:
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
The plight of cancer victims' now follows them out of the hospital
and into the workplace.2 As more cancer patients survive their initial
treatments and return to the job market,3 they face discrimination, often
with no express statutory protection. 4
Federal law presently protects limited classes of cancer victims:
those employed under federal contracts and those participating in or
seeking admission to federally funded programs.5 Only two states have
1. The term cancer victim as used in this note comprises both cancer pa-
tients and survivors. The term cancer patient as used in this note means any
person diagnosed as having cancer who is not a cancer survivor. The term can-
cer survivor as used in this note means any person who was previously diag-
nosed as having cancer but who has lived at least five years without recurrence of
the disease. If a person lives five years without a recurrence, the medical profes-
sion considers the person cured. See Learning to Survive, NEWSWEEK, April 8,
1985, at 72.
2. See Employment Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the Handicapped:
Hearings on H. R. 1294 and H. R. 370 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985) (state-
ment of Rep. Biaggi) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. As Representative Biaggi
stated during hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities
of the House Committee on Education and Labor: "An estimated one million
Americans have already encountered [employment discrimination based on can-
cer history] .... It can and does include many overt and subtle forms ranging
from job denial to wage reduction, exclusion from and reduction in benefits,
promotion denial, and even outright dismissal." Id.
3. See id. at 5 (statement of Rep. Martinez). Representative Martinez noted
during the hearings that an estimated five million Americans now have cancer or
a history of cancer. Id. He further observed that "[m]ore cancer patients are
surviving today than previously. Of the five million patients treated, three mil-
lion have passed the five-year mark of their diagnosis without relapse, which
medical authorities consider clinically cured for cancer." Id.
4. See The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706,
793, 794 (1982). The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 affords pro-
tection to cancer victims employed by federal contractors or involved in feder-
ally funded programs. Id. Only two states, Vermont and California, have
enacted statutes offering protection against cancer-related employment discrimi-
nation. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d (Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12926, 12940 (West 1980). For a more detailed discussion of these federal
and state statutes, see infra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
5. See The Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796i (1982). Section 706 of the Act defines "handicapped individual" as "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
(1549)
1
Bazemore: Employment Discrimination against Cancer Victims: A Proposed Solu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
enacted statutes that expressly prohibit cancer-related job discrimina-
tion by both public and private employers. 6 Forty-seven of the remain-
ing states have provisions in their fair employment acts that prohibit
discrimination against handicapped individuals. 7 In such states, there-
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 706(7)(B).
Section 793 of the Act requires that entities entering into contracts with the
federal government "take affirmative action to employ and advance in employ-
ment qualified handicapped individuals." Id. § 793(a). Section 794 prohibits
any program receiving federal aid from discriminating against handicapped per-
sons. Id. § 794.
6. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d(7)(c) (Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 12926(f), 12940(a) (West 1980). Vermont and California have both
included cancer in their statutory lists of protected handicaps. In Vermont, it is
unlawful "[ffor any employer, employment agency or labor organization to dis-
criminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, ancestry,
national origin, sex, place of birth, or age or against a qualified handicapped
individual." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(1) (Supp. 1985). A qualified handi-
capped individual is defined in part as one having a "physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more major life activities." VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5)(A) (Supp. 1985). The term "physical or mental impair-
ment" is in turn defined as including cancer. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 495d(7)(C) (Supp. 1985).
In California, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer,
because of the... medical condition ... of any person, to refuse to hire or
employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training pro-
gram leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge such person
from employment or from a training program leading to employment,
or to discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980) (emphasis added). "Medical condi-
tion" is defined in the statute as including "any health impairment related to or
associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has been rehabilitated
or cured, based on competent medical evidence." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(f)
(West 1980).
7. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws to pro-
tect the handicapped from employment discrimination. ALA. CODE § 21-7-8(1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.220 (1986), 47.80.010 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-1461 to 41-1463 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-2901 (Supp. 1985);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 to 24-
34-406, 24-34-801 (1982 & Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-51 to
46a-99 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9501 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-1705, 6-1709 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-760.37 (West 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-6A-1 to 34-6A-6 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to 378-9(1985); IDAHO CODE § 56-707 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-103, 2-
101 to 2-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-1 to 22-9-1-
13 (West 1981 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601D.2 (West 1975); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 39-1105, 44-1001 to 44-1013 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 207.130-
207.240 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1951, 46:2251-46:2256 (West 1982
& Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 781-790, 4551-4553, 4571-4573(1979 & Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14-18 (1986); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 37.1101-37.1209 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-363.14
(West 1966 & Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-149 (Supp. 1986), 43-6-15
(1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-213.126 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-2-101 to 49-2-601 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to 48-1126
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.310-613.430 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
1550 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1549
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fore, claims of job discrimination brought by cancer patients necessarily
have attempted to show that the results of cancer and cancer treatments
constitute a handicap. 8
This note will discuss the existing protections afforded cancer vic-
tims faced with discriminatory practices. It will then examine the states'
judicial treatment of cancer-related discrimination. Next, it will analyze
the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act,9 a federal bill presently
before the House of Representatives. Finally, this note will suggest that
the federal bill should be enacted to assure that all cancer patients re-
ceive adequate, consistent protection.
BACKGROUND
A. Existing Protections Under Federal and State Statutes
The scope of federal and state statutes that expressly prohibit job
§§ 354-A:1 to 354-A:14 (1984 & Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-
42 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-14, 28-10-1 to
28-10-12 (1983); N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-422.1 to 143-422.3 (1983), 168A-1 to 168A-12 (Supp.
1985); N.D. CErr. CODE §§ 14-02.4-01 to 14-02.4-21 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01 to 4112.99 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25 §§ 1101-1801 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.010-659.121, 659.400-
659.435 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-962.2 (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1986); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-5-1 to 28-5-39 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-33-
510 to 43-33-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 3-6A-15
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (Supp. 1986); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5221k (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-35-1 to 34-35-8 (1986);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495-497e (1978 & Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 51.01-40
to 51.01-46 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to 5-11-19 (1979 & Supp.
1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60-010 to 49.60-330 (Supp. 1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16.765 (West 1986), 111.31-111.395 (West 1974 & Supp. 1986).
8. See Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, 89 I11. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270(1982). In Lyons, the Illinois Supreme Court held that since the plaintiff's uter-
ine cancer did not "substantially hinder" her performance of "major life func-
tions," her condition was not a handicap within the meaning of either the state
constitution or the Illinois statute prohibiting employment discrimination
against handicapped persons. Id. at 171, 432 N.E.2d at 274; see also Kubik v.
CNA Financial Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981) (colon cancer not
within statutory definition of "handicap"); Goldsmith v. New York Psychoana-
lytic Inst., 743 A.D.2d 16, 425 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1980) (Hodgkin's disease consti-
tuted "disability" under New York law); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department
of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344 (1976)(leukemia included within definition of "handicap" under Wisconsin law). For a
further discussion of Lyons, see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of Kubik, see infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. For a
further discussion of Goldsmith, see infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. For
a further discussion of Chrysler, see infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
9. H.R. 1294, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. 22,815 (1985). For a
discussion of this Act, see infra notes 87-131 and accompanying text. See also
Hoffman, Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The Need for Federal
Legislation, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 21-32 (1986) (discussing purpose and scope of Can-
cer Patients Employment Rights Act).
1986] NOTE 1551
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discrimination against cancer victims is extremely narrow.' 0 Limited
and somewhat ambiguous protection is provided by the Federal Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"). I I Under the
Rehabilitation Act, government contractors have a duty to "take affirma-
tive action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped
individuals."'12 Moreover, any entity receiving federal financial assist-
ance has a duty not to discriminate against "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual[s]."' 3  For purposes of these non-discrimination
provisions, a handicapped individual is defined as one "who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impair-
ment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."' 14
Both the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and regulations
interpreting its provisions indicate that Congress intended this statutory
definition to extend to cancer survivors. 15 Those with a cancer history
apparently were intended to fit within the definition's second prong be-
10. For a detailed discussion of existing statutory provisions, see infra notes
11-32 and accompanying text.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982); see also Hoffman, supra note 9, at 10-14
(discussing protection afforded cancer patients by Rehabilitation Act).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1982). This statute provides:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal depart-
ment or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonper-
sonal services (including construction) for the United States shall
contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out
such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified
handicapped individuals as defined in section 706(7) of this title.
Id.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). This statute provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as
defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his hand-
icap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity con-
ducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
15. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6389; 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1985). Reporting on
the Rehabilitation Act's 1974 amendments, which added the definition of "hand-
icapped individual" currently used for purposes of the Act's non-discrimination
provisions, the Senate explained that the phrase, "has a record of such an im-
pairment," "is intended to make clearer that the coverage of sections 503 and
504 [29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794] extends to persons who have recovered-in whole
or in part-from a handicapping condition, such as . . . cancer." S. REP. No.
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6389.
Similarly, the regulations implementing the Act's 1974 amendments include
persons who have had cancer in the category of those who experience "difficulty
in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment" because of previous impair-
ment. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1985). These individuals in turn are deemed
4
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cause they have "a record of . . . an impairment [which substantially
limits major life activities]."' 6
The Rehabilitation Act also defines the term "severe handicap" to
include disabilities that result from cancer and that require "multiple
services over an extended period of time."' 7 While the non-discrimina-
tion provisions of the Rehabilitation Act do not offer express protection
to the severely handicapped, 18 a review of the Rehabilitation Act's legis-
lative history and general structure indicates that those with severe
handicaps are included within the general class of handicapped
individuals. 19
It appears that both cancer victims and cancer survivors fit within
the definition of "handicapped individuals" under the Rehabilitation
Act and thus should qualify for the Act's protections. 20 In reality, how-
ever, very few cases filed under the Rehabilitation Act have been filed by
cancer patients.2 1 Moreover, it is important to note that even when a
cancer victim invokes the Act's protection, he or she may be unable to
pursue a direct action against the offending federal contractor; some
federal courts hold that such actions may be brought only by the United
States Department of Labor. 22
to be handicapped within the meaning of the Act since they have "a record of...
an impairment." See id.
16. For the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, see supra note 15.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 706(13) (1982).
18. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982).
19. A major concern of the drafters of the Rehabilitation Act was to provide
adequately for individuals with the most severe handicaps. S. REP. No. 318, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2076, 2078.
The Act's legislative history emphasized the intent to make vocational rehabilita-
tion services available to the severely handicapped. See id. at 2092-95. The Sen-
ate Report acknowledged, however, that "there are handicapped individuals
whose handicaps are so severe ... that they may never achieve employment."
Id. at 2092. This language logically supports the inference that those with se-
vere handicaps are considered to be handicapped individuals within the meaning
of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7).
This inference finds further support in several sections of the Act itself.
Particular services governed by the Act are to be provided "to handicapped indi-
viduals, especially those with the most severe handicaps." See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§§ 772(b)(1), 777a(a)(l) (1982).
20. For a discussion of the definition of "handicapped individual" under
the Rehabilitation Act, see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
21. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 29 (testimony of Michael L. Spekter, Board
of Directors, One Fourth/The Alliance for Cancer Patients and Their Families).
In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities
during a hearing on the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, Michael L.
Spekter stated that only 1.3 percent of the suits filed under the Rehabilitation
Act have been filed by cancer patients. Id. None of these cases have generated
reported opinions. Spekter hypothesized that one of the reasons for this dearth
of litigation is poor administrative handling of claims. Id.
22. The Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part:
If any handicapped individual believes any contractor has failed or re-
fuses to comply with the provisions of his contract with the United
5
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Apart from the Federal Rehabilitation Act, only two states, Vermont
and California, have enacted statutes expressly protecting cancer victims
from employment discrimination. 23 These state statutes offer blanket
protection, although their scope is necessarily circumscribed by state
borders. 24 In Vermont, all employers are prohibited from discriminat-
ing against qualified handicapped individuals. 2 5 Persons with physical
impairments, including cancer, are subsumed under the statutory defini-
tion of handicapped individuals.2 6
In California, similarly, it is unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
nate on the basis of a medical condition, which is defined as "any health
impairment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which
a person has been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical
States, relating to employment of handicapped individuals, such indi-
vidual may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. The Depart-
ment shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take such
action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with
the terms of such contract and the laws and regulations applicable
thereto.
29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1982). This section has been interpreted by some courts as
giving no private right of action. See Hodges v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 728 F.2d
414 (10th Cir.) (Rehabilitation Act does not expressly or impliedly grant private
right of action), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 97 (1984); see also Painter v. Home Bros.,
710 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Ohio Barge Line, 697 F.2d 549 (3d Cir.
1983). But see Cal. Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. FCC, 496 F. Supp. 125 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (Rehabilitation Act creates implied private right of action), aff'd, 721 F.2d
667 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 121 (1984).
A private right of action has been held to exist, however, for those alleging a
violation of the Act's prohibition of discrimination against participants in or ap-
plicants to federally funded programs. See, e.g., Carter v. Orleans Parish Public
Schools, 725 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1984); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d
Cir. 1981).
23. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d (Supp. 1985); CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 12926, 12940 (West 1980).
24. Unlike the Federal Rehabilitation Act discussed above, the Vermont
and California statutes impose a duty not to discriminate upon all employers.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1985) ; CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West
1980). The federal statute, however, imposes that duty only on government
contractors and recipients of federal funds. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982).
25. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1985). This statute provides in
pertinent part that "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice, except
where a bona fide occupational qualification requires persons of a particular...
physical or mental condition: (1) For any employer, employment agency or la-
bor organization to discriminate against ... a qualified handicapped individual."
Id.
26. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495d(5), (7)(C) (Supp. 1985). The Ver-
mont statute mirrors the Federal Rehabilitation Act by defining "handicapped
individual" as any person who "(A) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities; (B) has a history or record
of such an impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
§ 495d(5). The statute, however, goes on to define "physical or mental impair-
ment" as including "such diseases and conditions as . . . cancer." Id.
§ 495d(7)(C).
1554 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1549
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evidence."'2 7 The California statute was successfully invoked by the
state's Department of Fair Employment and Housing on behalf of a wo-
man with a history of colon cancer who alleged that she had been
wrongfully dismissed because of her cancer history. 28 The California
Fair Employment and Housing Commission found that the woman had
both a "medical condition" and a "physical handicap" as defined in the
state act. 2 9 The Commission, therefore, found that she was protected
by two statutory provisions: the provision expressly protecting cancer
victims and the provision protecting those who are perceived to be phys-
ically handicapped.30 After concluding that her employer had discrimi-
nated against her because of the woman's medical condition and
perceived physical handicap, the Commission rejected the employer's
affirmative defense that accommodating her needs would impose undue
hardship. 3 ' Accordingly, the Commission awarded the woman both re-
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980). This provision has been in-
terpreted as serving to "put employers and employees on notice that the horror
of imminent death which has come to be associated with [cancer] is not justifica-
tion for discrimination." Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. King-
sburg Cotton Oil Co., No. FEP 80-81-C7-058 (Fair Employment and Housing
Comm'n Cal., Dec. 7, 1984) at 20 (quoting Department of Fair Employment and
Housing v. Interstate Boards, FEHC Dec. No. 78-05 (Fair Employment and
Housing Comm'n Cal. 1978) at 11).
28. Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil
Co., No. FEP 80-81-C7-058 (Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n Cal., Dec.
7, 1984). The complainant in Kingsburg, Virginia C. Austin, was fired from her
job of 23 years when she returned from a one-week hospital stay which was un-
related to her previous cancer treatment. Slip. op. at 13. Although her employer
asserted that the reason for Austin's termination was her "excessive absentee-
ism" resulting from hospitalizations unrelated to cancer, the Commission found
that this assertion was unsupported by the evidence." Id. at 14, 21. The Com-
mission concluded that Austin's employer "did have in mind her prior cancer-
related absences when he terminated her employment." Id. at 21.
29. Slip. op. at 18-20. Austin's employer, Kingsburg Cotton Oil, did not
contest the fact that Austin was a rehabilitated cancer victim at the time of her
dismissal and thus had a "medical condition" as defined by § 12926(f) of the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 18. The Commission read
the "medical condition" and "physical handicap" provisions of the Act to over-
lap. Id. at 20. The California "physical handicap" provision extends "to those
who are presently physically handicapped, those who are perceived as having or
having had a health impairment constituting a physical handicap, as well as those
who are perceived as having an increased likelihood of becoming physically
handicapped." Id. at 19. The Commission concluded that in speculating that
Austin would "continue to miss considerable amounts of time from work,"
Kingsburg thought that Austin would suffer future impairment. Id. at 20. Thus,
the Commission concluded that Kingsburg perceived that the complainant was
physically handicapped and, therefore, finally concluded that the complainant
fell within the category of those with a "physical handicap" under the Act. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 27, 32. The Commission found that Austin was fired both be-
cause of her past cancer-related absences and those her employer anticipated in
the future. Id. at 27. Kingsburg asserted by way of affirmative defense that Aus-
tin was unable to perform her job because of her medical condition and/or phys-
ical handicap and that she could not have been accommodated without imposing
7
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instatement and compensatory damages. 32
B. Judicial Treatment of Cancer-related Discrimination Absent Specific
Statutory Coverage
Many cancer victims do not qualify for the express statutory protec-
tions discussed above.33 When such patients have encountered discrim-
ination, they therefore have sought relief under their states' fair
employment acts and human rights laws, which generally prohibit dis-
crimination against handicapped or disabled individuals.3 4 Such suits
have spawned inconsistent results. 35
The Illinois courts have faced two cases in which cancer victims
have attempted to show that they were handicapped within the meaning
of both the state constitution and a state statute that prohibits discrimi-
nation against handicapped persons.3 6 In determining whether cancer
undue hardship on Kingsburg. Id. at 28. The Commission found that this de-
fense was without merit. Id. at 32. There was no evidence that Austin's ab-
sences caused Kingsburg a serious loss, nor was there evidence that she failed to
perform her duties satisfactorily. See id. at 28-30. Moreover, the Commission
found that the only accommodation necessary was covering "for Austin when
she was absent just as [Kingsburg] did for other absent employees." Id. at 32.
The Commission concluded that this accommodation would not have imposed
undue hardship on Kingsburg. Id.
32. Id. at 39-40. The Commission awarded Austin reinstatement, back pay,
all benefits of her employment that would have accrued during the liability pe-
riod, and compensatory damages for emotional distress. Id.
33. For a discussion of the limited express protection under federal law, see
supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of express protection
under state statutes, see supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432
N.E.2d 270 (1982) (applying Illinois Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped
Act and Illinois Constitution); Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d
715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981) (applying Illinois Equal Opportunities for the Handi-
capped Act and Illinois Constitution); Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic
Inst., 73 A.D.2d 16,425 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1980) (applying New York Human Rights
Law); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor and Human Re-
lations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344 (1976) (applying Wisconsin Fair Employ-
ment Act).
35. The Illinois courts, in Lyons and Kubik respectively, found that neither
uterine nor colon cancer was a protected handicap under the Illinois statute or
Constitution. See Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274; Kubik, 96 Ill.
App. 3d at 719, 422 N.E.2d at 4. On the other hand, the Wisconsin Circuit
Court, in Chrysler, found that acute lymphocytic leukemia was a protected handi-
cap under the Wisconsin statute. See Chrysler, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 345.
Finally, in Goldsmith, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that
discrimination based on Hodgkin's disease violated the New York human rights
laws. See Goldsmith, 73 A.D.2d at 26, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
36. Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270
(1982); Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp., 96 111. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981).
The provision of the Illinois Constitution applied in the two cases provides in
pertinent part: "All persons with a physical or mental handicap ... shall be free
from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of
any employer." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19. The Illinois Equal Opportunities for
8
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is a protected handicap, the courts applied the "major life functions"
test.3 7 Under this test, the court must determine whether an individual
cancer victim has a condition which is generally believed to impose se-
vere barriers upon his or her ability to perform "major life functions."3 8
Applying this test in Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp. ,3 the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish a discrimina-
the Handicapped Act ("Illinois Act") provided in pertinent part: "It is an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer ... to refuse to hire, to discharge, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's
physical or mental handicap, unless it can be shown that the particular handicap
prevents the performance of the employment involved." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 65-23 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (repealed by P.A. 81-1216, Art. 10, § 10-108, eff.
July 1, 1980), quoted in Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d at 165, 432 N.E.2d at 271; Kubik, 96 111.
App. 3d at 717, 422 N.E.2d at 3. The Illinois Act was repealed effective July,
1980, and was essentially replaced by the Illinois Human Rights Act (ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 68, §§ 1-101 to -105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986)). See 96 Ill. App. 3d at
716 n.l, 422 N.E.2d at 2 n.1. For a further discussion of the new Act, see infra
note 37.
37. See Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 166-71, 432
N.E.2d 270, 272-74 (1982); Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715,
718-19, 422 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1981). Although both the Illinois Act and constitution
prohibited discrimination against handicapped persons, neither contained a
workable definition of the term "handicap," thus forcing the Illinois courts to
develop one. See Note, Cancer as a Protected Handicap in Illinois: Lyons v. Heritage
House Restaurants, Inc., 60 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1984). The leading Illinois
case to set forth a definition of handicap is Advocates for the Handicapped v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 981 (1979). In Advocates, the court defined handicap as the "class of physi-
cal and mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers
upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions." 67 Ill. App. 3d
at 516-17, 385 N.E.2d at 43. The Lyons and Kubik courts applied this definition
rather than the circular definition of handicap which appeared in the Illinois Act.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-22 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (handicap defined as "a
handicap unrelated to one's ability to perform jobs or positions available to him
for hire or promotion") (repealed by P.A. 81-1216, Art. 10, § 10-108, eff.July 1,
1980).
The Illinois Human Rights Act, which essentially replaced the Illinois Equal
Opportunities for the Handicapped Act, includes a new statutory definition of
handicap. However, this new Act became effective subsequent to the dates of
the Acts in questien in Lyons and Kubik. See Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d at 165, 432 N.E.2d at
271. The current statutory definition states:
"Handicap" means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of
a person, including, but not limited to, a determinable physical charac-
teristic which necessitates the person's use of a guide, hearing or sup-
port dog, the history of such characteristic, or the perception of such
characteristic by the person complained against, which may result from
disease, injury, congenital condition of birth or functional disorder and
which characteristic: (1) . . .[I]s unrelated to the person's ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). Since its enact-
ment, this definition has been neither applied nor interpreted by an Illinois
court in a reported opinion.
38. Advocates, 67 I11. App. 3d at 516-17, 385 N.E.2d at 43.
39. Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1.
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tion claim. 40 The plaintiff in Kubik had been discharged from his job
after a malignant tumor had been removed from his colon. 4 1 Although
the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was unable to perform ma-
jor life functions because of his cancer, the court found that this bare
allegation was insufficient to establish a handicap. 4 2
In the second case, Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants,43 the plaintiff
allegedly had been dismissed from her position as manager of kitchen
operations after her employer learned that she had developed uterine
cancer. 44 Reversing the appellate court's decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff had not established a handicap because she
had failed to allege that her uterine cancer substantially hindered her in
major life functions or that her employer perceived her cancer as creat-
ing such a hindrance. 4 5 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
the plaintiff had not claimed to be hampered in such major life activities
as "caring for [herself], performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hear-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning, [or] working."'46
In contrast, a Wisconsin court, applying a different definition of
handicap, 4 7 concluded in Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Dep't of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations4 8 that a cancer patient had established a handicap.
The plaintiff in Chrysler, who suffered from acute lymphocytic leukemia,
alleged that the defendant's refusal to hire him was discriminatory be-
cause it was based on his medical condition.49 Chrysler admitted that its
40. Id.
41. Id. at 716, 422 N.E.2d at 2. The plaintiff had been employed by the
defendant for several years and had received raises and promotions. Id.
42. Id. at 716, 719, 422 N.E.2d at 2, 4. In his amended complaint and affi-
davit, the plaintiff alleged
that he had a malignant tumor on his colon which was successfully re-
moved; that doctors would not consider him cured until five years had
passed without a recurrence; and that he "was physically handicapped
in that his physiological condition limited and is regarded as limiting
certain of his major life functions."
Id. at 719, 422 N.E.2d at 4. The court determined that these allegations were
insufficient because they did not "assert a physical handicap under the Advocates
interpretation of that term." Id.
43. 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270 (1982).
44. Id. at 164, 432 N.E.2d at 271. The plaintiff asserted that her condition
would not have affected her ability to perform her duties. Id. She sued her em-
ployer for damages consisting of the loss of salary, insurance benefits and use of
the company car. Id.
45. Id. at 170-71, 432 N.E.2d at 274. Since the court found that plaintiff
was not handicapped, she did not qualify for the protections of article I, § 19 of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution or the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped
Act. Id. For the text of the operative provisions, see supra note 36.
46. 89 Ill. 2d at 170, 432 N.E.2d at 274 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)
(1980)).
47. For a discussion of the definition of handicap applied by the Wisconsin
court, see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
48. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344 (1976).
49. Id.
1558 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1549
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negative hiring decision was prompted by two concerns related to the
plaintiff's leukemia: the risks of lost work time and increased insurance
costs.
5 0
Addressing the preliminary question of handicap, the Chrysler court
followed a prior decision defining a handicap as "a disadvantage that
makes achievement unusually difficult; esp[ecially]: a physical disability
that limits the capacity to work." 5' 1 The court concluded that the plain-
tiff was handicapped under this definition because his illness made it
hard for him to find work, thus making achievement unusually diffi-
cult. 52 The court proceeded to reject the defendant's asserted reasons
for refusing to hire the plaintiff.53 Having found that leukemia consti-
tuted a handicap under state law and having rejected Chrysler's de-
fenses, the court awarded the plaintiff relief.54
In Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic Institute,55 a New York court
also found that a cancer victim was protected from discrimination under
state law. 56 In Goldsmith, the plaintiff's Hodgkin's disease had been in
50. Id. Chrysler's hiring decision was made on the recommendation of its
medical consultant. Id. The medical consultant found that because of the plain-
tiff's disease, the plaintiff was at high risk of suffering infection from minor inju-
ries, of enduring prolonged recuperation from injuries, arid of suffering
complications arising from injuries, all of which would lead to lost work time. Id.
51. Id. at 345 (quoting Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. State Dep't of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446
(1974)). Lacking a statutory definition of "handicap," the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Chicago adopted this dictionary definition of the term. 62 Wis. 2d at
398, 215 N.W.2d at 446 (quoting WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1027 (Merriam 3d ed. 1961)). The Chicago court held that asthma makes
achievement unusually difficult and thus is a protected handicap under the Wis-
consin Fair Employment Act. 62 Wis. 2d at 398, 215 N.W.2d at 446.
Wisconsin's current statutory definition of handicap, enacted after Chrysler
was decided, combines the language of the Chicago definition with that found in
the Federal Rehabilitation Act: "'Handicapped individual' means an individual
who: (a) Has a physical or mental impairment which makes achievement unusu-
ally difficult or limits the capacity to work; (b) Has a record of such an impair-
ment; or (c) Is perceived as having such an impairment." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.32(8)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1985).
52. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 345.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court noted that the Wisconsin statute allowed employers to
refuse to hire any person who because of a handicap is unable to efficiently per-
form the duties of the job. Id. The court went on to find, however, that the
defendant did not contend that the plaintiff would be unable to perform the
duties of the job for which he applied. Id. Rather, the defendant asserted that
its refusal to hire the plaintiff was a sound business decision in light of a higher
risk of absenteeism and increased insurance costs. Id. Dismissing these reasons
for the defendant's hiring decision, the court commented that if an employer
discriminates against the handicapped, his intent and motives are irrelevant. Id.
55. Goldsmith v. New York Psychoanalytic Inst., 73 A.D.2d 16, 425
N.Y.S.2d 561 (1980).
56. Id. at 19-20, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 564. This determination was made by the
State Division of Human Rights. Id. At the time that the alleged discriminatory
acts in Goldsmith occurred, the New York Human Rights Law defined disability as
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remission for several years5 7 when, despite her outstanding qualifica-
tions, she was denied admission to the defendant institute's research
program for advanced students. 58 Finding substantial support in the
record, the New York Supreme Court affirmed an administrative deter-
mination that Hodgkin's disease constituted a disability within the
meaning of the New York Human Rights Law and that the defendant
had unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff.59 Like the Wisconsin
court in Chrysler, the Goldsmith court found the purposes for the defend-
ant's discriminatory practices irrelevant and held that the defendant had
violated plaintiff's right to the "equal opportunity to enjoy a full and
productive life." 6°
ANALYSIS
A. Inadequacy of Existing Protections
Because specific statutory protection for cancer patients and survi-
vors is very limited,6 1 most of them are protected from job discrimina-
tion only if they demonstrate that they are handicapped or disabled
a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical,
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of
a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, provided, however, that in
all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be
limited to physical, mental or medical conditions which are unrelated to
the ability to engage in the activities involved in the job or occupation
which a person claiming protection of this article shall be seeking.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 1976).
57. 73 A.D.2d at 17, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
58. Id. Defendant's program was designed to train psychoanalysts. Id.
Plaintiff held a Ph.D in psychology, and her application to defendant's program
"was supported by eminent and renowned psychiatrists, some of whom [were]
members of the Institute." Id. The Institute's stated reasons for not accepting
the plaintiff were that her need for chemotherapy would interfere with the
mental functions needed for analysis, and that placing a patient with an analyst
who had a chronic and potentially fatal illness would be detrimental to the pa-
tient. Id. at 19, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 564. The court indicated parenthetically that
these concerns were not only irrelevant but were also vitiated by evidence that
the plaintiff's prognosis was favorable. Id. at 27, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
59. Id. at 21-25, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 565-68. In reviewing the administrative
agency's decision, the New York Supreme Court did not focus on the plaintiff's
status as a member of a protected class, as did both the Illinois and Wisconsin
courts. Id. See Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270; Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715,
422 N.E.2d 1; Chrysler, 14 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. 344. Instead, the Goldsmith court
conducted a detailed factual inquiry into the circumstances of the alleged dis-
crimination and concluded that the agency's finding that the defendant's dis-
criminatory actions violated state human rights law was supported by substantial
evidence in the record and thus was not arbitrary or capricious. 73 A.D.2d at 21-
25, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 565-68.
60. Id. at 26, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 290(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1982) (policy section of New York Human Rights Law)).
61. For a discussion of the federal and state statutes expressly protecting
cancer victims, see supra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
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within the meaning of the applicable state statute. It is suggested, how-
ever, that these state anti-discrimination statutes provide inadequate
protection for cancer victims.
Specifically, cancer patients have been granted uneven protection
under these state statutes. 6 2 Plaintiffs with histories of uterine and colon
cancer have been denied the protection of the Illinois Fair Employment
Law.6 3 In Wisconsin and New York, however, plaintiffs with histories of
leukemia and Hodgkin's disease have been granted relief under state
anti-discrimination statutes. 64 Although these cases appear inconsis-
tent, it is submitted that they were not incorrectly decided under the
applicable laws. Each court applied a different definition of handicap or
disability, and each plaintiff was afflicted with a different disease. 65
62. For a discussion of relevant cases, see supra notes 33-60 and accompa-
nying text.
63. Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d 163, 432 N.E.2d 270; Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422
N.E.2d 1. For a discussion of Lyons, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Kubik, see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
64. Chrysler, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344; Goldsmith, 73 A.D.2d 16, 425
N.Y.S.2d 561. For a discussion of Chrysler, see supra notes 47-54 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of Goldsmith, see supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text.
65. In both Illinois cases, the major life function test was applied in order to
determine whether cancer was a handicap. Lyons, 89 Ill. 2d at 170-71, 432
N.E.2d at 274; Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19, 422 N.E.2d at 3-4. In Chrysler,
the Wisconsin court defined handicap as "a disadvantage that makes achieve-
ment unusually difficult; esp: a physical disability that limits the capacity to
work." 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 345 (quoting Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R.
v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 398, 215
N.W.2d 443, 446 (1974)). Finally, in Goldsmith, the New York court apparently
relied on the following definition of disability found in the state Human Rights
Law:
The term "disability" means a physical, mental or medical impairment
resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demon-
strable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic tech-
niques, provided, however, that in all provisions of this article dealing
with employment, the term shall be limited to physical, mental or medi-
cal conditions which are unrelated to the ability to engage in the activi-
ties involved in the job or occupation which a person claiming
protection of this article shall be seeking.
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McKinney 1976). This definition has recently been
amended and now reads as follows:
The term "disability" means (a) a physical mental or medical impair-
ment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological condi-
tions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is
demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques or (b) a record of such an impairment or (c) a condition
regarded by others as such an impairment, provided, however, that in
all provisions of this article dealing with employment, the term shall be
limited to disabilities which do not prevent the complainant from per-
forming in a reasonable manner the activities involved in the job or
occupation sought or held.
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 292(21) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
13
Bazemore: Employment Discrimination against Cancer Victims: A Proposed Solu
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 1549
Because there is no uniform definition of the term handicap or disa-
bility under the various state statutes, discrimination actions brought by
the same cancer victim in two different states could yield conflicting re-
sults. It is submitted, for example, that a cancer patient who has under-
gone a successful colostomy would probably be protected under the
New York Human Rights law, but might go unprotected under Wiscon-
sin law. The New York law defines disability as "a physical ... impair-
ment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological
conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function
....,66 Such a plaintiff probably could establish a disability under this
statute by arguing that his "impairment" (i.e., a colostomy) resulted
from a "physiological condition" (i.e., cancer) and prevents the "exer-
cise of a normal bodily function" (i.e., defecating normally). In Wiscon-
sin, such a plaintiff would be required to establish that his colostomy was
a "physical ... impairment which makes achievement unusually difficult
or limits the capacity to work."'6 7 If he is otherwise fit and fully able to
perform the functions of the job he seeks, the plaintiff could have diffi-
culty proving that he is handicapped under the Wisconsin statute. 68 It is
Each plaintiff was afflicted with a different type of cancer. See supra notes
41, 44, 49 & 57 and accompanying text. The five-year survival rate for each type
of cancer was not correlated to the finding of a handicap. See infra note 74. For
example, the plaintiff in Goldsmith had a higher chance of survival than did the
plaintiff in Kubik; Goldsmith was found disabled, while Kubik was not. See supra
notes 42 & 59 and infra note 74 and accompanying text. For a further discussion
of the five-year survival rates for different types of cancer, see infra note 74.
66. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
67. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8) (West Supp. 1985).
68. On the other hand, if the plaintiff asserts that his impairment limits his
capacity to work, his employer might counter that the plaintiff is thus unqualified
for the job. By placing the plaintiff in a position where he is forced to argue that
his physical impairment has an adverse effect on his capacity to achieve and/or
work, the Wisconsin statute brings the plaintiff close to arguing that he would be
unable to adequately perform a particularjob. This is a precarious position be-
cause Wisconsin employers are under no obligation to hire unqualified handi-
capped individuals. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(f) (West 1974 & Supp.
1985).
The Illinois "major life functions" test poses a problem similar to that
posed by the Wisconsin statute. By proving an impairment of a major life func-
tion, Illinois plaintiffs have come very close to arguing impairment of a work-
related function. See Kubik, 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 1 (1981); Cf Kirby v.
Ill. Central Gulf R.R., 117 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 454 N.E.2d 816 (1983) (complaint
alleging that spina bifida posed no barrier to plaintiff's work performance dis-
missed). In Illinois, as in Wisconsin, an employer is under no obligation to hire
employees who cannot perform their jobs. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-
103(I)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986). For a further discussion of the major life
functions test and the problems it poses, see Note, supra note 37, at 727.
Although Illinois has recently adopted a new statutory definition of handi-
cap, it is submitted that the new definition, like its predecessor, is circular and,
therefore, unworkable. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(I) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986) (handicap defined as "determinable physical or mental characteristic ...
which.., is unrelated to the.., ability to perform the duties of a particular job
1562
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submitted that this inconsistency is an inevitable result of the states' dif-
ferent definitions of handicap or disability.
Another reason why the state anti-discrimination statutes are inade-
quate to protect cancer victims is the fact that cancer is not merely one
disease. 69 Cancer has been defined as "many different illnesses requir-
ing a wide range of treatment."' 70 Because cancer includes "many ill-
nesses", case-by-case adjudication of claims brought under state fair
employment acts will not produce strong precedents. It is suggested,
for example, that a state court's finding that leukemia is a protected
handicap might have little precedential value in a later case brought by a
breast cancer patient.
A final reason why the state statutes provide inadequate protection
to cancer victims is that many cancer victims are not disabled at all and
thus cannot benefit from existing anti-discrimination laws. 7 1 Without a
disability and without a legal remedy, most cancer patients, neverthe-
less, face the discriminatory attitudes of employers and co-workers. 72
or position"). Thus, it is suggested that Illinois courts will continue to apply the
major life functions test.
69. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 18, 20.
70. Hearings, supra note 2, at 20. Individuals with different forms of cancer
have varying survival rates. See infra note 74. Moreover, different forms of can-
cer have significantly different effects on productive employment. Hearings, supra
note 2, at 18. A study conducted by Greenleigh Associates and published by the
American Cancer Society indicates that one-seventh of those with prostate can-
cer lost job income, while one-half of those with lung cancer suffered such a loss.
Id.
71. Hearings, supra note 2, at 15, 29, 38, and 41. Dr. McKenna compared
the disability question to a Catch-22 situation. Id. at 15. He recounted the di-
lemma of a man who had undergone a laryngectomy for cancer of the larynx. Id.
The man was refused new employment by 26 employers but yet was unable to
collect disability payments because he no longer had cancer. Id.
72. See id. at 32-33. See also King, After Cancer: Trouble on the Job?, CANCER
NEWS, Autumn 1984, at 6; Canellos, Ill-Founded Notions: Job Discrimination Against
Cancer Patients, Boston Phoenix, Jan. 15, 1985, at 1. According to studies per-
formed by Frances Feldman for the American Cancer Society, the myth that can-
cer is contagious has resulted in both dismissals and behavioral abuse by co-
workers. Canellos, supra, at 4.
Unlike other serious diseases, cancer carries with it a stigma and a host of
phobias that may be felt by co-workers as well as employers. According to Dr.
McKenna, President of the American Cancer Society, the prognoses of cancer
victims are often viewed with pessimism. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 20, 32-33.
Dr. McKenna compared a person having a cancer history to one having a history
of heart disease. Id. at 32-33. He stated: "Cancer is singled out from all the
other diseases. Most people are very optimistic about heart disease .... You
either win or lose, but you go back to work. You never think you could get
another heart attack, which a significant number of people do .. " Id. at 32.
McKenna noted that while employers rarely discriminate against a former heart
patient, employers often discriminate against former cancer patients. Id. at 33.
The myth that cancer is uniquely fatal has prompted employers to assume that a
cancer patient has no future and thus should be written off the company's long-
range plans. King, supra, at 6.
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B. The Need for Protection
Recent statistical studies have highlighted the extent of cancer-re-
lated job discrimination and the often erroneous beliefs upon which dis-
criminatory actions are based.73 It is important to note at the outset that
a diagnosis of cancer is not the equivalent of a death sentence. Depend-
ing on the location of the cancer, five year survival rates are as high as
ninety-three percent.7 4 Moreover, cancer patients are not characterized
by decreased work performance or absenteeism.7 5 In fact, cancer-re-
lated job absences are infrequent when compared with lengthy absences
caused by other illnesses. 76 A major insurance company has selectively
employed cancer victims since 1957. 77 After fourteen years of this prac-
tice, the company found no significant differences between the turnover
rates, absenteeism and work performance of the cancer victims and
other employees. 78 The company concluded that " 'the selective em-
ployment of persons with cancer history, in positions for which they are
73. For a discussion of these studies, see infra notes 74-82 and accompany-
ing text.
74. Learning to Survive, supra note 1, at 73. A table showing the five-year
survival rates for diagnoses made between 1976 and 1981 of 20 types of cancer
indicates a great disparity between different types of cancer. Id. Survival rates
range from 93% (thyroid) to 2% (pancreas). Id.
It is interesting to note the survival rates for the four types of cancer which
afflicted plaintiffs in the state court cases discussed supra notes 28-60 and accom-
panying text. As set forth in the Newsweek study, the survival rate for uterine
cancer is 85% (Lyons); for Hodgkin's disease 73% (Goldsmith); for colon cancer
52% (Kingsburg and Kubik) and for leukemia 32% (Chrysler). Id. The study also
revealed the following survival rates for 16 other types of cancer: thyroid (93%),
testis (86%), melanoma (80%), breast (74%), bladder (73%), prostate (70%),
cervix (67%), kidney (50%), rectum (49%), non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (48%),
ovary (38%), brain (23%), stomach (16%), lung (13%), esophagus (5%) and
pancreas (2%). Id. The sources for the Newsweek study were the National Can-
cer Institute and the American Cancer Society. Id.
75. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18 (prepared statement of RobertJ. McKenna,
M.D., President, American Cancer Society). Dr. McKenna cited a study showing
that the turnover rate, absenteeism, and work performance of a selected group
of employees with a cancer history were comparable to that of the company pop-
ulation. Id.
76. Id. at 16-17. In a class of illnesses causing prolonged job absences, can-
cer is ranked 14th most frequent for men and 15th for women. Id. The length
of sick leave due to cancer averaged 93.3 days for men and 108.3 days for wo-
men. Id.
77. Id. at 18. Between 1957 and 1971, the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company hired 74 applicants with a cancer history. Id. This number was
slightly more than 6% of the company's new employees during the study period.
Id.
78. Id. Of the cancer patients hired, 55% were still working at the end of
the study; 3% were on disability; and 42% had left their jobs, "but most left
voluntarily and for a variety of reasons." Dotson, Only a Ghost of a Chance, TEXAs
BusINESS, Aug. 1977, at 18, 23. Less than 3% developed a recurrence of cancer.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 18. During the study period, none of the cancer survi-
vors were discharged and none died. Dotson, supra, at 23.
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physically qualified, is a sound industrial practice.' -79
Despite these positive indications, cancer victims are facing dismis-
sals, demotions, job rejection and hostility.8 0 At a hearing on the Can-
cer Patients Employment Rights Act, Dr. RobertJ. McKenna, President
of the American Cancer Society, presented statistical evidence sug-
gesting that twenty-five to forty-five percent of workers with a cancer
history experience job rejection.8 ' According to his data, over fifty per-
cent of such workers encounter some discriminatory treatment on the
job.s 2
The reasons for cancer-related job discrimination fall into two basic
categories: fear of absenteeism and skyrocketing group health insurance
premiums. 8 3 According to Dr. McKenna, some employers expect cancer
victims to be absent frequently because of treatments, cancer recur-
rence, or complications from prior treatment.84 Employers also face the
more tangible risk that their group health insurance premiums will rise if
they hire a cancer victim who might need expensive treatments in the
future.8 5 Insurance discrimination has been called an "economic excuse
not to hire a cancer patient."'86
C. The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act
It is evident that a federal statute is needed to adequately protect
cancer patients and survivors from job discrimination.8 7 Such a statute,
79. Dotson, supra note 78, at 23.
80. Hearings, supra note 2, at 19. Dr. McKenna classifies the work-discrimi-
nation encountered by cancer patients into three categories: 1) dismissals, de-
motions, and other actions taken by employers, 2) shunning and overt hostility
of co-workers, and 3) hostility of the patient himself used as a defense against
the anticipated actions of others. Id. It is suggested that this classification is
very broad and that the inclusion of the third category of work-discrimination is
debatable.
81. Id. Dr. McKenna cited three studies performed by Frances Feldman for
the American Cancer Society. Id. These studies revealed that 22% of white-
collar workers with a cancer history have faced job rejection. Id. With respect to
blue-collar workers and youths with a cancer history, the figure was 45%. Id.
82. Id. The Feldman studies indicated that the occurrence of work-related
problems encountered by the white-collar, blue-collar, and youth workers were
54%, 84% and 51% respectively. Id. The findings of the Feldman studies were
subsequently confirmed by the Greenleigh study, which was also funded by the
American Cancer Society. See id.
83. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 16.
84. Id. Excessive absenteeism would pose the greatest problem to smaller
companies which would be unable to shift work from an employee who is under-
going cancer treatment to one who is not. Boston Globe, Nov. 28, 1983, at 43.
85. Hearings, supra note 2, at 50-51 (prepared statement of Ivan Barofsky,
Ph.D., Institute of Social Oncology). Most group health plans have experience-
adjusted premiums which fluctuate according to how much insurance the group
uses. Canellos, supra note 72, at 4.
86. Canellos, supra note 72, at 4 (citing Sarah Splaver, President, Cancer
Hopefuls United for Mutual Support).
87. To illustrate the need for a federal law expressly protecting cancer pa-
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the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, has been introduced by
Rep. Mario Biaggi in the House of Representatives.8 8 The stated pur-
poses of the Act are fourfold: 1) to discourage cancer-related job dis-
crimination; 2) to encourage employers to make reasonable
accommodations for persons with a cancer history; 3) to publicize the
"employability" of those with a cancer history; and 4) to encourage fur-
ther legislation to protect cancer victims from other types of
discrimination.8 9
The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act would not affect rights
or remedies provided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.90 Rather,
the Act would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to specifically in-
clude those with a cancer history as a protected class. 9 ' The Act con-
tients from job discrimination, a proponent of the Cancer Patients Employment
Rights Act, a bill presently before Congress, advanced the following telling sta-
tistics. Hearings, supra note 2, at 37. While only 1% of all actions brought be-
tween 1974 and 1978 under the Federal Rehabilitation Act have been brought
by cancer victims, 10% of the discrimination complaints filed in California are
filed by persons with a cancer history. Id. at 37. According to the proponent of
these statistics, they show "that the current Federal law isn't really adequate to
handle the situation." Id. It is submitted that this statistical discrepancy may
have resulted from the fact that California cancer victims, unlike those protected
under the Federal Rehabilitation Act, enjoy clear and specific protection. See
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926() (West 1980).
The strength of that protection was exhibited in Department of Fair Em-
ployment and Housing v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., No. FEP 80-81-C7-058
(Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n Cal. Dec. 7, 1984). In Kingsburg, the
plaintiff had a history of colon cancer. Slip op. at 7. While the defendant em-
ployer disputed the plaintiff's allegation of physical handicap, the defendant did
not contest the plaintiff's allegation that she had a medical condition within the
meaning of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 18-20. The
term "medical condition" is defined in the California Act as "any health impair-
ment related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer, for which a person has
been rehabilitated or cured, based on competent medical evidence." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980). It would thus appear that a showing of rehabili-
tated or cured cancer, based on competent medical evidence, indisputably trig-
gers the protections of the California Act. It is submitted that such an automatic
trigger is needed under federal law in order to protect all cancer victims. For a
further discussion of the California statute and the Kingsburg case, see supra notes
28-32 and accompanying text.
88. H.R. 1294, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 22,815 (1985). The
bill was introduced on February 27, 1985, and was referred to the Committee on
Education and Labor. 131 CONG. REC. at 22,815.
89. H.R. 1294 § 2(b)(1)-(4).
90. H.R. 1294. Section 4 of the bill provides that "[t]he amendments made
by this Act do not affect any right, remedy, obligation, or responsibility under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." H.R. 1294 § 4. For a discussion of the Rehabil-
itation Act as it relates to cancer victims, see supra notes 11-22 and accompany-
ing text.
91. H.R. 1294 § 3(a). The term "cancer history" is defined as "the status of
any individual who has, or has had cancer, or who is diagnosed as having, or
having had cancer. For the purposes of this subsection the term 'cancer' means
any disease characterized by uncontrolled growth and spread of abnormal cells."
Id.
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tains three basic substantive provisions. 9 2 First, it would prohibit
employers from requiring a person with a cancer history to meet unnec-
essarily high medical standards or to reveal unnecessary medical infor-
mation as a condition of employment. 93 Second, it would prohibit labor
organizations from requiring persons with a cancer history to submit to
unnecessary examinations or reveal unnecessary medical information.9 4
Finally, it would require that employers make a good faith effort at rea-
sonable accommodation of employees with a cancer history.9 5 By in-
Title VII presently provides for equal employment opportunity by prohibit-
ing discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). In addition to the Cancer Patients Employment Rights
Act, there is now another bill before the House which would amend Title VII.
That bill would make the handicapped a protected class under Title VII. H.R.
370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 2,104 (1985).
92. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). These provisions would be appended to § 704 of
Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982)), which deals with "[o]ther unlawful em-
ployment practices." Id. The Act would also extend the basic provisions of Title
VII to individuals with a cancer history. H.R. 1294 § 3(c). The Title VII provi-
sions affected as are follows: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (employer practices); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (employment agency practices); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (la-
bor organization practices); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (training programs); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (bona fide occupational qualification); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (bona fide seniority or merit system); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (pref-
erential treatment not required); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (publications indicating
preference or discrimination prohibited); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (relief avail-
able); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (discriminatory practices of federal government);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (civil actions).
For the text of the substantive provisions of the Cancer Patients Employ-
ment Rights Act, see infra notes 93-95 & 99 and accompanying text.
93. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). The Act would make it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer, employment agency or labor organization to
(A) require, as a condition of employment, an employee or prospec-
tive employee with a cancer history to meet medical standards which
are unrelated to job requirements, or to require such employee or pro-
spective employee to submit to a medical examination or reveal any
medical information unless such examination or information is neces-
sary to reveal qualifications essential to job performance; or
(B) reveal any confidential medical information concerning such an
employee or prospective employee without the express written consent
of such employee or prospective employee.
Id.
94. Id. The Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to
require a member or potential member with a cancer history to submit
to a medical examination or reveal any medical information relating to
cancer history without the express written consent of such member or
potential member unless such examination or information is necessary
to reveal qualifications essential to membership in such labor
organization.
Id.
95. Id. The Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail to
make a good faith effort to explore whether reasonable accommoda-
tions may be made for an employee or prospective employee with a
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cluding people with a cancer history among those protected by Title
VII, the Act would give cancer patients and survivors a private right of
action against their employers.
9 6
In order to prove a prima facie case under Title VII, a complainant
would have to show (1) that he or she has a cancer history; (2) that he or
she is qualified for a particular job; (3) that, despite his or her qualifica-
tions, he or she was rejected, fired, or otherwise discriminated against by
an employer; and (4) that, after his or her rejection, termination, demo-
tion, etc., the employer continued to seek employees from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
97
Several defenses would be available to employers. First, an em-
ployer could rebut a prima facie case by articulating "some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the allegedly discriminatory action.98
Further, the Act itself provides that an employer would not be guilty of
an unlawful employment practice if he could establish either that a can-
cer victim could not reasonably be accommodated without undue hard-
ship or that the cancer victim would be unable to safely perform the job
requirements. 99 Two general Title VII defenses also would be available
cancer history which would enable the employee or prospective em-
ployee to fulfill the job requirements. Whether an accommodation is
reasonable shall be determined according to the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case. Factors relevant to the determination of
reasonableness include administrative costs, cost of the physical accom-
modations, the cost of disruption of existing work practices, the size of
the employer's business, and the safety of existing and potential
employees.
Id.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). Under Title VII, an aggrieved person
may bring a civil action against his or her employer or prospective employer if
one of three conditions is met. Id. These conditions are 1) the dismissal of a
charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2) the Com-
mission's failure to bring a civil action within 180 days of the filing of such
charge, or 3) the Commission's failure to enter into a conciliation agreement to
which the aggrieved person is a party. Id. Cancer victims in some jurisdictions
who are employed by Federal contractors presently do not enjoy a private right
of action under the Federal Rehabilitation Act. See supra note 22 and accompa-
nying text.
97. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In
McDonnell Douglas, the United States Supreme Court established the elements of
a prima facie case for Title VII individual disparate treatment claims. See id.
98. Id. The burden would then shift back to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's stated reason for his action was in fact a pretext. Id. at 804.
99. H.R. 1294 § 3. The Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, or
to discharge or classify, an employee or prospective employee with a
cancer history if-
(A) the employer demonstrates that such employer is unable to rea-
sonably accommodate an employee or prospective employee to enable
such employee or prospective employee to fulfill the job requirements
without undue hardship to the employer; or
(B) the employee or prospective employee is unable to perform the
[Vol. 31: p. 15491568
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to employers accused of discriminating against cancer victims: the bona
fide occupational qualification defense' 0 0 and the bona fide seniority or
merit system defense.'10 Under the bona fide occupational qualification
(bfoq) defense, an employer would prevail if he established that the ab-
sence of a cancer history is a "bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of [his] business or
enterprise."' 1 2 It is submitted that it would be extremely difficult for
defendant employers to prove this defense, especially since the bfoq de-
fense has been deemed "only the narrowest of exceptions to the general
rule requiring equality of employment opportunities."' 10 3 Under the
bona fide seniority or merit system defense, an employer would prevail
if he could establish that his allegedly discriminatory actions were taken
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system and that the system
itself was not "the result of an intention to discriminate."' 10 4
D. Analysis of the Act
It is submitted that the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act
would provide much needed federal protection for cancer patients and
survivors. 10 5 It is submitted, however, that while some provisions
job requirements in a manner which would not endanger the safety of
such employee, prospective employee, or others, regardless of the
availability of reasonable accommodations.
Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). This section provides that it is not
an unlawful employment practice to discriminate "on the basis of ... religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise ...." Id.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). This section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or
to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its ad-
ministration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982).
103. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (holding that being
male was a bona fide occupational qualification for "contact" positions in maxi-
mum security male prison). It is hard to imagine a situation where the absence
of a cancer history would be a bona fide occupational qualification.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
105. It has been argued that the extension of Title VII protections to the
handicapped would be "too complicated, expensive, and time-consuming";
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should be enacted as proposed, others require changes that would im-
pose more stringent obligations on employers. 10 6
1. Scope of Protected Class
It is suggested that the Act properly circumscribes the class of per-
sons protected. 10 7 The Act's definition of "cancer history" extends to
those who have or have had cancer and to those diagnosed as having or
having had cancer. 10 8 Thus, individuals who have recovered from the
disease but who still suffer from its stigma would enjoy the same protec-
tion as those currently undergoing treatment.1 0 9 Moreover, individuals
who never in fact have had cancer but who have been diagnosed as hav-
ing cancer would also be protected. In commenting on the Act, the
Legal Aid Society of San Francisco ("Society") has suggested that the
definition of cancer history should be expanded to include those with
precancerous conditions, those erroneously perceived as having cancer,
and those deemed to be future cancer risks."I 0 It is submitted, however,
that such an expansion would sweep too broadly. The Society has of-
fered no statistics or case histories showing that the additional classes it
since "[h]andicaps vary greatly in nature and severity," the federal courts would
be forced to make individual determinations on the innumerable claims brought
before them. Peck, Employment Problems of the Handicapped: Would Title VII Reme-
dies Be Appropriate and Effective?, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 343, 362, 380 (1983). But
see Hoffman, supra note 9, at 32-34 (recommending adoption of Cancer Patients
Employment Rights Act and suggesting it would save federal funds).
It is submitted that although the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act
would undoubtedly spawn a great deal of litigation, its value to the growing class
of unprotected cancer survivors far outweighs any administrative cost or incon-
venience it may cause.
106. The following discussion will substantially track a statement prepared
by the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco ("Society") and presented at the June
6, 1985 Hearings on the Act. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 21-27.
107. H.R. 1294 § 3(a). For the text of this section, see supra note 91.
108. H.R. 1294 § 3(a). For the text of this section, see supra note 91.
109. Cancer survivors have allegedly been victims of discriminatory acts.
See Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co.,
No. FEP 80-81-C7-058 (Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n Cal. Dec. 7,
1984) ("rehabilitated" victim of colon cancer); Goldsmith, 73 A.D.2d 16, 425
N.Y.S.2d 561 (five-year "survivor" of Hodgkin's disease).
110. Hearings, supra note 2, at 23-24 (prepared statement, Legal Aid Society
of San Francisco). In support of its suggestion of an expanded definition of
cancer history, the Society advanced the cases of several hypothetical plaintiffs
who would not fall within the Act's protections because of its present limited
definition of cancer history. Id. According to the Society, the following plain-
tiffs, deserving of protection, would not find protection under the Act as drafted:
1) a woman with a family history of cancer who was at risk of developing the
disease herself; 2) a man rumored to have cancer; 3) a man whose employer
mistakenly believed he had cancer; and 4) a woman who has a breast examina-
tion. Id. In order to bring these hypothetical plaintiffs within the Act's ambit,
the Legal Aid Society suggested that language similar to that in the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act be adopted, i.e., "related to or associated
with . . . cancer." Id. at 24. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(f) (West 1980).
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seeks to protect have suffered employment discrimination. Lacking such
a demonstration, it is suggested that the definition of cancer history is
adequate as drafted because it extends to all individuals who have had or
have been diagnosed as having the disease.
2. Disclosure of Medical History
It is submitted that the Act provides sufficient safeguards against
the disclosure of unnecessary medical records."I' The Act makes it an
unlawful employment practice for employers to require individuals with
a cancer history to "meet medical standards which are unrelated to job
requirements," or to "submit to a medical examination or reveal any
medical information unless such examination or information is neces-
sary to reveal qualifications essential to job performance."' " 2 In this
respect, the Act tracks the language used in regulations promulgated
under the Federal Rehabilitation Act which limit the use and scope of
pre-employment examinations and inquiries.'1 3 It is submitted that
such an approach is beneficial because it will force employers to articu-
late job-related medical qualifications and will minimize the risk of un-
warranted invasions into the privacy of cancer patients and survivors.1 14
111. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). For the text of this provision, see supra notes 93-95.
112. H.R. 1294 § 3(b).
113. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.706(a)-(d) (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (1985).
The former regulation sets forth standards for equal employment opportunity in
the federal government. 29 C.F.R. § 1613. It provides in pertinent part that
an agency may not conduct a preemployment medical examination and
may not make preemployment inquiry of an applicant as to whether the
applicant is a handicapped person or as to the nature or severity of a
handicap. An agency may, however, make preemployment inquiry into
an applicant's ability to meet the medical qualification requirements,
with or without reasonable accommodation, of the position in question,
i.e., the minimum abilities necessary for safe and efficient performance
of the duties of the position in question.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.706(a). There are two exceptions to this general rule. Pre-
employment examinations of the handicapped may be conducted if "[a]ll enter-
ing employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of handicap."
Id., § 1613.706(b). Also, employers may request applicants to voluntarily fill out
questionnaires designed to evaluate the employers' affirmative action programs.
Id., § 1613.706(c).
Part 84 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations regulates handicap
discrimination in federally funded programs. 45 C.F.R. § 84.11-. 14 (1985). The
regulation provides in pertinent part that
[a] recipient may not conduct a preemployment medical examination or
may not make preemployment inquiry of an applicant as to whether the
applicant is a handicapped person or as to the nature or severity of a
handicap. A recipient may, however, make preemployment inquiry into
an applicant's ability to perform job-related functions.
45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a). Exceptions exist for 1) the voluntary disclosure of medical
information for purposes of remedial or affirmative action and for 2) the con-
ducting of medical tests required of all applicants. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(b)-(c).
114. See Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
In Doe, the plaintiff, who had had a nervous breakdown in the past, applied to
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3. Requirements for Reasonable Accommodation
It is submitted that the Act should be reworded to impose an affirm-
ative duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation for indi-
viduals with a cancer history. 115 As drafted, the Act merely requires
employers "to make a good faith effort to explore whether reasonable ac-
commodations may be made.' 16 It is submitted that this language is
insufficient, because even if employers discover reasonable accommoda-
tions in their "explorations", they are under no duty to make such ac-
commodations. Moreover, by asserting that their "explorations" had
been fruitless, employers might successfully defend a discrimination ac-
tion brought by a protected individual with a cancer history.
The Society has suggested that the Act should require employers to
provide reasonable accommodation to individuals with a cancer history
unless such accommodation would cause an undue hardship."17 Fur-
thermore, the Society has suggested that the meaning of undue hardship
should be clarified by providing a statutory list of factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the employer." 8 It is submitted that the notion of undue
hardship is adequately set forth through the Act's list of "factors rele-
vant to the determination of reasonableness."' 1 9 Relevant factors in-
the defendant school district for the position of teacher's assistant and substitute
teacher. Id. at 335. During the course of his application, the plaintiff was asked
whether he had ever experienced "migraine, neuralgia, nervous breakdown, or
psychiatric treatment." Id. The district court found that this inquiry violated 45
C.F.R. § 84.14, which prohibits recipients of federal funding from conducting
pre-employment inquiries regarding handicap unless such inquiries relate to an
applicant's ability to perform job-related duties. Id. at 336-37. Since the de-
fendant school district admitted in its pleadings that "a history of treatment for
mental or emotional problems is not an indication of plaintiff's present fitness
for a position as a teacher's assistant or substitute teacher," its inquiry regarding
the plaintiff's emotional history was impermissible. Id. at 337. It is submitted
that Doe bodes well for cancer survivors since the provisions of the Cancer Pa-
tients Employment Rights Act regarding pre-employment inquiries are so simi-
lar to the regulation applied in Doe. Compare H.R. 1294 § 3(b) (employers may
seek only that medical information "necessary to reveal qualifications essential
to job performance") with 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(a) (pre-employment inquiry limited
to "applicant's ability to perform job-related functions").
115. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1985) (requiring federal agencies to make
"reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of a
qualified handicapped applicant or employee"); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1985) (re-
quiring same of recipients of federal funds).
116. H.R. 1294 § 3(b) (emphasis added).
117. Hearings, supra note 2, at 25 (statement of Legal Aid Society of San
Francisco). See infra note 118.
118. Hearings, supra note 2, at 25. The suggested factors to be considered in
determining whether accommodation imposes an undue hardship on an em-
ployer include the overall size of the establishment, the type of operation being
conducted, the nature and cost of accommodation, and the availability of tax
incentives and public and private assistance for providing such accommodation.
Id.
119. H.R. 1294 § 3(b).
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clude "administrative costs, cost of the physical accommodations, the
cost of disruption of existing work practices, the size of the employer's
business, and the safety of existing and potential employees.' 120 It is
submitted that if a court examines each of these factors and concludes
that accommodation is not reasonable, the court has necessarily deter-
mined that such accommodation imposes an undue hardship.' 2 1
A final suggestion of the Society regarding reasonable accommoda-
tion merits brief mention. The Society noted that, in the religious dis-
crimination context, "cases have essentially held that an accommodation
which imposes anything more than a 'de minimus' cost in wages or loss
of efficiency would be an impermissible hardship to the employer."'
12 2
The Society proposed that the Act explicitly assert that the de minimus
standard does not apply under its provisions.123 It is submitted that this
proposal should be followed. A de minimus standard is not suitable be-
cause it would render an employer's duty to accommodate individuals
with a cancer history almost meaningless.
4. Statutory Defenses
It is submitted that the statutory defenses afforded employers under
the present bill must be revised in order to limit their scope. Under the
Act as drafted, employers can avoid liability (1) if they "demonstrate"
that a person with a cancer history is unable "to fulfill the job require-
ments without undue hardship to the employer," or (2) if the cancer
victim is unable to safely perform "job requirements."' 12 4 It is submit-
ted that the Act must clearly establish that the employer has the burden
of proving the second defense as well as the first.' 25 This clarification
120. Id.
121. Although it is submitted that the adoption of the Society's "clarifica-
tions" regarding undue hardship would not substantively alter the Act, it is sub-
mitted that the adoption of the Society's recommendation that statutory
examples of reasonable accommodation be inserted would be beneficial. Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 25. The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act
provide the following examples of reasonable accommodation: making facilities
accessible to the handicapped, job restructuring, and modification of work
schedules. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b). It is submitted that
the two latter accommodations would be especially helpful to the cancer patient
or survivor and should be mentioned in the Act. Because of cancer-related sur-
gery, individuals may be unable to perform all functions of a particular job; this
inability could potentially necessitate job restructuring. Other cancer victims
might be forced to undergo radiation or chemo-therapy during regular work
hours; this would probably necessitate modification of work schedules.
122. Hearings, supra note 2, at 25. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977) (costs incurred in allowing member of Worldwide Church of God
to take Saturdays off constituted undue hardship under de minimis standard).
123. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 25.
124. H.R. 1294 § 3(b). For the full text of this provision, see supra notes
93-95.
125. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 26-27 (statement of Legal Aid Society of
San Francisco). While the employer must demonstrate the incapacity defense,
25
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could be accomplished by inserting the words "the employer demon-
strates that" before the existing language of the safety defense.' 26 It is
further submitted that the term "job requirements" should be replaced
by the term "essential job functions."' 12 7 In its analysis of the Act, the
Legal Aid Society of San Francisco correctly noted that, under the Act's
current language, "cancer survivors who could perform all but the ines-
sential job duties might not have any protection" because they techni-
cally could not fulfill the "job requirements" of a particularjob.128 This
problem would be obviated if the essential job function test were used.
5. Statutory Relief
Finally, it is submitted that the relief provided under Title VII
would afford cancer patients and survivors adequate protection. Under
Title VII, the following remedies may be awarded: injunctive relief and
"such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropri-
ate." 2 9 Traditionally, this language has been interpreted to preclude
he has no obligation under the Act to demonstrate the safety defense. Id. See
H.R. 1294 § 3(b).
126. The safety defense would then read:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge or classify, an employee or pro-
spective employee with a cancer history if- (B) [the employer dem-
onstrates that] the employee or prospective employee is unable to
perform the job requirements in a manner which would not endanger
the safety of such employee, prospective employee, or others, regard-
less of the availability of reasonable accommodations.
See H.R. 1294 § 3(b).
127. The essential job functions test appears in the regulations implement-
ing the Rehabilitation Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(o (1985). This test is used to
show whether a particular selection criterion is discriminatory. Prewitt v. United
States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 307 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit as-
serted that
[t]he test is whether a handicapped individual who meets all employ-
ment criteria except for the challenged discriminatory criterion "can
perform the essential functions of the position in question without en-
dangering the health and safety of the individuals or others." If the
individual can so perform, he must not be subjected to discrimination.
Id. at 307 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.702(f) & .703).
128. Hearings, supra note 2, at 26. To illustrate the difference between job
requirements and essential job functions, the Society advanced the following
case history:
[A]n individual with paralysis of his upper left arm and with a hearing
disability applied for a job as a police dispatcher. His inability to
change a teletype roll was not seen as an essential job function because
others at his work station could load the teletype. In contrast, the re-
quirement of normal hearing was related to an essential job task and
thus there was no duty to accommodate.
Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
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recovery of compensatory or punitive damages.13 0 In addition, the pre-
vailing party in a Title VII action may be awarded costs and a reasonable
attorney's fee.' 3 ' It is submitted that cancer patients or survivors who
seek the protections of the Act are entitled to no more than the tradi-
tional Title VII "make whole" relief. There is no rational basis for ac-
cording cancer victims greater rights than those discriminated against
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is, therefore,
submitted that there is no need to add a remedies provision to the Act.
CONCLUSION
Cancer patients and survivors are currently faced with job discrimi-
nation and are inadequately protected from such discrimination. Ex-
press statutory protection is limited,' 3 2 and suits brought under state
fair employment laws spawn inconsistent results.' 3 3 Recent statistics
have shown that cancer-related job discrimination is prevalent. 134 It is
submitted that this growing problem must be addressed at the national
level. The Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act, particularly if the
changes discussed above are implemented,' 3 5 is a workable solution to
the problem of employment discrimination against cancer patients and
survivors and is necessary to assure that every individual afflicted with
cancer will enjoy the same protections upon returning to the job market.
Lisa Bazemore
130. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1452
(2d ed. 1983).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
132. For a discussion of the limited express statutory protection, see supra
notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of these inconsistent results, see supra notes 33-60
and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of these statistics, see supra notes 73-82 and accompa-
nying text.
135. For the text of the suggested changes, see supra notes 115-128 and
accompanying text.
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